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Abstract
The past few years have seen the development and growth of traded securities with
payoffs tied to natural and industrial disasters.  Pricing the insurance features imbedded
in these securities is difficult and imprecise.  This lack of pricing precision translates to
greater required return premiums to holders of these securities.  This paper explores the
nature of pricing uncertainty for a number of datasets, security designs, and loss
distributions using both jackknife and bootstrap techniques.  The economic impact of
pricing uncertainty is then briefly explored given comparisons of prices from secondary
market trading to more common issues with similar risk characteristics and predictions
from theoretical models.
James F. Moore







A new class of traded assets has recently emerged in the financial marketplace -
securities with features tied to natural catastrophes.  These bonds and derivatives represent a
potentially significant expansion of the market for reinsurance coverage for both primary
property-casualty insurers and reinsurers.  These financial instruments supplement existing
reinsurance coverage and in some cases allow for protection from extreme losses that may
not have been previously available.
1   
Severe damage caused by recent natural disasters such as Hurricane Andrew and the
Northridge and Kobe earthquakes have drawn attention to immense potential losses for both
insurers and for government disaster relief agencies.  Estimates of a hurricane of Andrew's
force hitting Miami or New York, or an earthquake of substantial magnitude centered in San
Francisco or Los Angeles, have prompted insured damage estimates in excess of $50 billion.
When viewed in comparison to an industry-wide surplus of approximately $200 billion this
may at first blush seem a manageable disaster.  However, it is important to note that much of
the industry reserves are dedicated to unrelated coverage such as automobile liability and
physical damage or homeowner's insurance in unafflicted areas.  In the event of a catastrophe
of such magnitude, this lack of fungibility of surplus will surely lead to insolvencies of some
insurers and spill-over claims to insurance guarantee funds and state and federal disaster
relief agencies.
Citing such risks to relief agencies, Lewis and Murdock (1996) propose pre-funding
for potential future losses by selling federal excess-loss reinsurance.  These proposed policies
would cover industry disaster losses in the $25 billion to $50 billion region.  Cummins,
Lewis, and Phillips (1996) extend the analysis by offering a pricing mechanism for such
                                                       
1 Jaffee and Russell (1997) examine some the major reasons why traditional insurance mechanisms have
failed to meet the need for catastrophic coverage to date.2
federal excess-loss insurance.  They propose an auction similar to that used for Treasuries,
but with a reservation price derived from a parametric fit of past catastrophe data adjusted for
price inflation.
While the federal government has proven reluctant to provide such coverage, the
private market is beginning to see opportunity.  A number of private security issues have
been placed in the past year with USAA's Residential Reinsurance issue specifically of note.
2
The USAA deal stands out as an indicator of the potential size of this market and is
noteworthy because of a) the size of the issue, b) the relative simplicity of its structure, c) the
premium offered to investors, d) significant coinsurance charges to USAA in the event of a
triggering catastrophe, and e) the excess demand for the securities (which can largely be tied
to  (a) - (d)).  The issue raised some $477 million in financing to provide $400 million of
coverage against catastrophe losses to USAA's book of homeowners business.  Trigger
catastrophes were limited to damage associated with a single east coast hurricane of class 3
or higher.  The bond was divided into two tranches.  The first is principal protected and pays
LIBOR plus 273 basis points and the second, or junior tranche, puts principal at risk and pays
LIBOR plus 576 basis points.  Investors are in effect purchasing a one year LIBOR floater
and underwriting single event catastrophic reinsurance.  As result of the bond's attractive
features, the underwriting investment banks received offers for the bonds in excess of $1.1
billion.
3
Who is buying these instruments and for what purpose?  Due to their complexity and
potential risk, to date most issued securities have been Section 144a offerings.
4  Unlike other
                                                       
2 Borden and Sarkar (1996) and Lewis and Davis (1997) provide overviews of the security market to date
with some analysis of the issues involved in the early development of this market.
3 Hennessey (1997) and Reinebach (1997).
4  Section 144a securities are restricted principally to Qualified Institutional Buyers (a) acting for its own
account or the accounts of other qualified institutional buyers, that in the aggregate owns and invests on a
discretionary basis at least $100 million in securities of issuers that are not affiliated with the entity; or  (b)3
financial innovations, such as mortgage backed securities, catastrophe-linked bonds offer no
natural hedging opportunities for a specific classes of investors.  As such, they are primarily
being touted for their use as a portfolio diversification instrument.  Litzenberger, Beaglehole,
and Reynolds (1996) argue that these may be attractive investments due to their small
correlations with historical stock and bond returns of 0.058 and 0.105, respectively.
5  It is
likely that principal protected tranches appeal to investors such as banks and life insurers who
have risk based capital concerns, while the secondary tranches appeal to more aggressive
investors such as mutual funds, hedge funds, or reinsurers who may have an informational
advantage in pricing the underlying risks.
Who is and will be issuing these securities in the future as well as their impact on
traditional reinsurance coverage remains an open question.  Garven and Lamm-Tennant
(1996) find that purchasers of reinsurance tend to be highly levered and have books of
business with long payout tails.  In addition, they find a strong negative relationship between
size and reinsurance purchases.  Small insurers are much more likely than larger firms to
reinsure.  Based on what we have seen to date, this is to a large degree the opposite of who is
initiating securities deals.  Perhaps the fact that large insurers are the early issuers in this
market is an anomaly attributable to high start-up costs that small insurers cannot bear and as
markets deepen, and more varied securities appear, securities will develop with mechanisms
                                                                                                                                                                    
Any dealer registered pursuant to section 15 of the Exchange Act, acting for its own account or the
accounts of other qualified institutional buyers, that in the aggregate owns and invests on a discretionary
basis at least $10 million of securities of issuers that are not affiliated with the dealer, Provided, That
securities constituting the whole or a part of an unsold allotment to or subscription by a dealer as a
participant in a public offering shall not be deemed to be owned by such dealer.
5 If we use the CAPM as a benchmark, this raises an apparent paradox.  In a CAPM world, the low
correlations (and subsequently low b's) would argue for a relatively small premium over the risk-free rate.
Yet this is clearly not the case for the USAA deal.  Issue prices indicate that there is a substantial premium
being paid by the issuer to place these bonds.  Whether this is a long run phenomenon will not be known
for some time.  It is likely that this can be viewed as a "transaction cost" necessary to establish this market
and that after time, additional securities, specifically securities written based on other catastrophes and in4
appropriate for smaller firms.
6   Another view is that these securities are providing coverage
that existing reinsurance mechanisms cannot match and the development of these securities
will extend reinsurance capacity rather than redistributing business from existing reinsurers
to the capital markets.
With the dissemination of these securities comes a need for growth in tools to
evaluate the underlying risks involved.  To some degree, this has been met by the birth and
growth of firms with specialized knowledge in meteorological or geophysical prediction.
7    
These companies rely on sophisticated simulation models to predict the likelihood and
severity of catastrophe damage to geographic regions and to specific insurers' books of
business.  Their simulation models rely on proprietary data to create such estimates.
8  Others,
without the resources of the modeling firms (primarily academics), have used adjusted
historical data from such sources as Property Claims Services (PCS) or the Insurance Service
Office (ISO) to fit parametric distributions and have given pricing estimates as the expected
value of losses conditional on surpassing some threshold.
To date there are no published analyses of higher moments of these conditional loss
estimates, nor comparisons of parametric distributional forms using these moments.  The
remaining sections of this paper explore these issues using small-sample variance estimation
techniques, specifically the jackknife and the bootstrap, for a number datasets, distributions
                                                                                                                                                                    
other parts of the world (e.g.: California Earthquake, Pacific Rim Earthquake, European Windstorm, etc.)
will narrow this premium.
6 The cost to issuers for these securities are high.  In addition to the coupon rates previously mentioned,
issuers must pay sizable fees to investment banks, lawyers, and modeling firms as well as audit costs in the
event of a triggering catastrophe.  It may not be surprising to see future issues of smaller insurers
"piggybacking" on issues of large insurers by having their triggers/payouts tied to the loss experience of a
larger issuer.  The extent to which this exposes the "piggybacker" to basis risk  in its coverage is an open
question.
7 Applied Insurance Research (AIR), EQECAT, and Risk Management Solutions (RMS), are the three
largest and most visible of the companies provide specialized modeling expertise to insurers, regulators,
and investors.
8 Dong, Shah, and Wong (1996) provide some insight into such modeling and insurance pricing in general.5
and potential security designs.  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II presents the methodology used, focusing on the data, choice of distributions, security form,
simulation methodology, and a brief synopsis of the jackknife and bootstrap.  Section III
presents the results of the jackknife and bootstrap estimation and inferences for distribution
choice and reinsurance or security pricing.  The fourth section discusses the economics and
pricing of catastrophe bonds focusing on the USAA issue and provides an illustrative
example of the pricing importance of distribution uncertainty. The final section concludes the
paper by summarizing the results and proposing directions for future research.
2. Methodology
The steps used to explore parametric catastrophe security pricing are as follows
9:
1. Using a maximum likelihood procedure, fit a distribution of choice to the catastrophe
data and determine a vector of distribution parameters  $ Q .
2. Use resampling techniques to perturb estimates of the parameters for the chosen
distribution.
a."Jackknife" the distribution parameter estimates by successively dropping a single
observation from the catastrophe data, obtaining n alternative parameter estimates
{ $ Q -1 ,…, $ Q -i ,…, $ Q -n}, where  $ Q -i is the parameter estimate with the i
th  observation
dropped and the estimation procedure run on the remaining n-1 observations.
b. Bootstrap the distribution parameter estimates by drawing with replacement
pseudo-samples of the same size as the original sample from which a predetermined
number (2000) of alternative parameter estimates are constructed.
                                                                                                                                                                    
9 It should be noted that pricing here refers to as a valuation or actuarial notion of pricing, essentially the
actuarially fair price of the underlying contract.  In a perfectly competitive market with risk-neutral firms,
this is what we would expect to see.  Under less restrictive assumptions on market structure and/or agent
preferences, these "prices" can best be viewed as lower bounds on market prices.6
3. From the estimated distributions simulate payoffs corresponding the desired security
design.
4. Use the simulations to calculate expected values and jackknife/bootstrap standard errors
of security prices.
5. Repeat the process for alternative securities and distributions.
6. Calculate t-statistics using the simulation expected value estimates and jackknife standard
errors to compare alternative distribution assumptions.
7. Characterize the empirical distribution of security price estimates using the bootstrap
estimates.
Data
Two datasets are explored. The first dataset used for this study is available in
Litzenberger, et al. (1996).   Observations consist of Adjusted Historic Loss Ratios based on
PCS reported industry catastrophe losses for the years 1956 - 1994.  Loss ratios represent the
ratio of catastrophe losses in a period, divided by the weighted sum of the previous year's
earned premiums.  Historic loss ratios are adjusted to reflect the relative increase in the
proportion of total United States population living in California and Florida.
10  Histograms of
the data are presented in Figure 1.
The second dataset is for insured damages attributable to hurricanes. Figure 2
provides histograms of the insured losses attributable to hurricanes striking the United States
for the period 1949-1993.  Losses are adjusted for increases in housing value by state and are
expressed in 1994 dollars.
11
Loss Distributions
                                                       
 10 See Litzenberger, et al. (1996) for details of the loss ratio adjustments
11 Values are adjusted using the values of owner-occupied housing obtained from the U.S. Census of
Housing, series HC80-1-A.   For details of the adjustment see Cummins, Lewis, and Phillips (1997).7
Five parametric distributions are fit to the data. While parametric distributions have
their own limitations, they allow for characterization of potential losses beyond the maximum
observed loss ratio in the data.  Non-parametric or semi-parametric techniques like
bootstrapping historical data or kernel density estimation may reveal features in the central
mass of the loss distribution that a parametric density will overlook, but they perform poorly
out of sample.
The distributions used are the Lognormal, Weibull, Pareto, Burr 12, and the
Generalized Beta Type 2 (GB2).  The lognormal is used as a baseline for comparison.  While
popular for use in securities modeling because of its analytic tractability, its thin tail may
understate the likelihood of large losses.  Similarly the Weibull generally yields light tails but
is included for purposes of comparison.  The Weibull is frequently used in engineering
applications to assess time to failure and has been used for some insurance purposes.  The
Pareto, Burr 12, and GB2 all generate heavier tails than either the Weibull or the lognormal
and have seen prior use in modeling insurance data.
12 The lognormal, Weibull, and Pareto are
all two parameter distributions, the Burr 12 is a three parameter distribution, and the GB2 is a
four parameter distribution.  The GB2 can be viewed in some sense as the "mother"
distribution.  Given certain parameter restriction as described in McDonald and Richards
(1987), the GB2 collapses to the Burr 12 or the lognormal.
13  The probability density
functions (PDF) and cumulative distribution functions (CDF) are given below:
                                                                                                                                                                    
12 Cummins, et al. (1990) shows applications of the GB2 and related distributions for insurance loss
modeling.  Bookstaber and McDonald use the GB2 to characterize return distributions.
13 These five distributions are by no means an exhaustive list of the modeling possibilities.  Embrechts, et
al. (1997) presents many more possibilities such as the Frechet (related to the Weibull) or the Gumbel.  The
creative econometrician or actuary could create an almost limitless set of modeling distributions by taking
transformations of other distributions with known properties (e.g.: log-Cauchy. log-t, etc.)8
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For the adjusted historic loss ratios, three contracts or securities are modeled.  The
first of these is a pure CAT call option, or excess-loss contract, with a trigger level of 25% of
the Adjusted Historic Loss Ratios (AHLR's).  This can be viewed as a conditional
expectation of the value in the tail beyond the trigger point.   The payoff associated with the
contract is [Loss Ratio - 25%]
+ * Earned Premiums, where [x]
+ is max (x, 0).
The second security is an excess-loss layer extending from the 25% trigger to a cutoff
of 50% of AHLR, or a CAT call-spread. The payoff for this security is {[Loss Ratio - 25%]
+ -
[Loss Ratio - 50%]
+} * Earned Premiums.  This security is similar in nature to traditional
catastrophic reinsurance or the PCS catastrophe call option spreads traded on the Chicago
Board of Trade.
14
The third security is a knock-in catastrophe call with a trigger at 30% of AHLR.  This
security has a payoff similar to the first security, but pays off only if losses exceed 30% of
AHLR, or  {[Loss Ratio - 25%]
+ | LR>30%}* Earned Premiums.
Two contract designs are modeled for hurricanes.  These are both structured similarly
to traditional excess of loss reinsurance or the hurricane bonds that have been issued.  These
are similar to the CAT call-spread described above or can alternatively be thought of as
reinsurance layers. We examine two such layers for the hurricane data and industry losses.
The first layer would provide cover for industry losses between $10.0 billion and $20.0
billion dollars.  This layer would afford coverage for storm damage of roughly half of the
damage caused by Hurricane Andrew to an event that did slightly more damage.  Andrew is
the only historical event fitting within this layer.
                                                       
14 Details of the PCS catastrophes can be found in Chicago Board of Trade (1995).  D'Arcy and France
(1992) present early analysis of the then prospective CBOT catastrophe options.  The nature of the
contracts and their underlying indices have been revised since their inception.10
The second layer examined is dubbed a “USAA Industry Layer” as it corresponds to
applying the level of coverage obtained in the Residential Reinsurance bond issue
($1B/$1.5B) for USAA and scaling this up to industry losses.  This is done by multiplying
the Residential Re. Attachment points by industry losses due to Andrew ($16B, $1992) and
dividing by USAA’s losses attributable to Andrew ($555M, $1992), yielding an industry
layer of $28.8B to $43.3B.
15
Simulation
Once distributions are estimated using Maximum Likelihood, individual securities
may be priced by simulation.  The simulation method used combines importance sampling
and antithetic variates.  For each security, 2500 draws are taken from a uniform [0,1] interval.
Given each of these values u ˛ [0,1], a second value u
- = (1-u) ˛ [0,1] is obtained.  The
threshold level corresponding to the point at which the given security would be "at the
money" is determined and the cumulative density function is calculated for this value.  For
the case of the first two securities examined, this corresponds to a25 = CDF(25%).  In-the-
money sample simulation values are calculated as u
* = a25 + (1 - a25)* u, or  u
* = a25  + (1 -
a25)* u
-.  The CDF is then inverted to give simulated catastrophe values, z = CDF
-1(u
*).  This
sampling methodology is more efficient than a naïve Monte Carlo simulation.  For example,
if a25 = 0.95, these 2500 draws are equivalent to [1/(1 - 0.95)]* 2 * 2500 =100,000 naïve
draws.  The expected value and simulation standard deviation of the pricing estimate are
respectively for the first security,
                                                       
15 The accuracy of this approach depends on how well USAA’s incurred losses correlate with the industry’s
overall Andrew related losses.  It is probable that because of USAA’s underwriting characteristics (writing
largely to active duty and retired military personnel clustered near military installations) that this approach
may overstate the likelihood of such an event when placed in an industry context (in other words, not place
the layer far enough out into the tail).    Using the same ratios, the $10B/$20B industry layer translates to
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The jackknife procedure dates to the late 1940's or early 1950's and is usually
attributed to John Tukey.
16  Like its sister method, the bootstrap, which it predates, the
jackknife relies on the "Russian Doll" principle of sampling.  The idea is that if a sample
dataset is a representative subset of potential outcomes, then a random subsample from the
dataset is itself a representative subset of the data and hence potential outcomes.  While the
bootstrap is performed by repeatedly sampling from the data with replacement to get an
arbitrary (though generally large) number of representative samples "similar" to the dataset
from which one calculates parameters and then variance estimates, the jackknife
systematically drops observations to get n subsamples of n-1 observations each from which
pseudo-parameters and then variance (or bias) estimates are then derived.
17
The jackknife procedure for estimating standard error is as follows:
1. Estimate  $ Q  and { $ Q -1 ,…, $ Q -i ,…, $ Q -n} as described above
18.
                                                       
16 Tukey is also credited with naming the jackknife as well.  It is said that he was looking for a small,
flexible, and relatively precise tool with which to solve a given problem (a jackknife) and not a procedure
that would be overkill (so-called sledgehammer or shotgun approaches).  Efron and Tibshirani (1993) and
Mooney and Duval (1993) provide nice introductions to the jackknife and comparisons to the bootstrap.
17 Alternative versions of the jackknife can be calculated dropping more than one observation at a time.
Doing so requires additional computations.  For the drop-one jackknife n+1 parameter estimates are








+ 1 parameter estimates are required.
The properties of alternative jackknife estimators are explored in Efron and Tibshirani (1993).
18 As a point of clarification, Q may or may not represent the same parameters referenced earlier.  Jackknife
standard errors may be calculated for distribution parameters, but they may also be used to characterize any
other statistic in question – here for example, the pricing estimates.12
2. Calculate pseudo parameters 
~
Q i , where 
~
Q i = n $ Q  - (n-1) $ Q -i .
3. Estimate the sample variance of 
~
Q .
4. Through algebraic manipulation it can be shown that the jackknife standard error estimate











$ $ Q Q . 
19
The Bootstrap
The procedure for estimating standard errors using the bootstrap is conceptually
similar in nature to the jackknife in that standard error estimates are created by repeatedly re-
drawing samples from the original data.  While the construction of each jackknife sample is
known a priori, this is not the case for the bootstrap.  Here a pseudo-sample of size N (where
N is the number of datapoints in the sample) is randomly drawn from the data sample with
replacement.  If we think of the pseudo-sample as a draw with each datapoint in the sample
having the same likelihood of being chosen, 1/N, the most likely (and most frequently
occurring) pseudo-sample will be our true sample which will be drawn with probability N! *
(1/N)
N.  Pseudo-samples with repeated occurrences of single or multiple datapoints are less
common but allow for variation in estimation of the statistic in question.  Because the
bootstrap pseudo-samples are randomly drawn a larger number are needed to construct
standard error estimates using the bootstrap than the jackknife.
Though the jackknife allows for a nice characterization of standard errors of
estimates, under some circumstances it may be flawed.  Efron and Tibshirani (1993) show
that the jackknife can best be viewed as a linear approximation to bootstrap estimates.  When
the underlying statistics are linear, such as the mean of a sample, the standard error estimate
generated by the jackknife gives a good approximation for what would be found using the
                                                       
19 See Efron and Tibshirani (1993).13
bootstrap and does so in a more computationally efficient manner.  However if the statistic in
question is nonlinear, such as a correlation coefficient, a percentile of the underlying
distribution (e.g.: the sample median), or an order statistic, the jackknife may provide an
inaccurate estimate of the standard error of the statistic in question.
The direction and size of the bias from the jackknife estimate of standard error is not
necessarily known a priori.  Efron and Tibshirani (1993) provide an example of sample
correlation and show that the jackknife estimate of the standard error overstates the standard
error achieved with the bootstrap.  This would be a nice result if it proved true for our
estimates for the CAT calls and call spreads estimated earlier as it would give us greater
confidence in our estimates and potentially allow for better model specification.
3.1 Results
Adjusted Historic Loss Ratios
The results of the distribution estimation and AHLR security pricing simulations for
the five distributions examined are given in Tables 1 and 2a-e. with Table 1 presenting
summary results for the valuation estimates of the securities across distribution assumptions.
Table 2a.giving results for the lognormal distribution, 2b. the Weibull, 2c. the Pareto, 2d. the
Burr 12, and 2e. the GB2.  For Tables 2a-e., the first set of columns give estimation results
pertaining to estimation of the individual distributions.  These include parameter estimates,
the value of the log likelihood function obtained, the asymptotic standard errors of the
parameter estimates derived from the likelihood function's information matrix evaluated at
the parameter estimates, and jackknife estimates of the standard error of the parameter
estimates.
The second set of columns provides estimates of expected losses under the three
securities.  Estimates of expected losses are given as a percentage of industry premiums and14
also in dollar amounts based on 1996 earned premiums.
20  Standard errors are presented in
loss ratio terms.  The standard errors given are the simulation standard errors conditional on
using the full dataset for estimation and jackknife standard errors.
The final three columns of each table present expected return periods for annual
catastrophe damages corresponding to 25%, 30%, and 50% of earned premiums.  These are
the reciprocal of the probability of these events occurring.  These figures give some sense of
the shape of the tails for the individual distributions.   Jackknife standard errors of these
return period estimates are also provided.
In addition to the full sample estimation results, the tables also present the results of
each estimation for which a datapoint was dropped.  The estimated parameters from these
MLE estimations were used to calculate jackknife standard error estimates, and are
informative to illustrate the leverage of individual observations.  Extreme values for the
security expected values and estimated return periods are indicated in boldface.
Looking across the five tables, the likelihood values are comparable in size for the
lognormal (-1405), the Weibull (-1405), and the Pareto (-1451), with the two distributions
with thinner tails appearing to provide slightly better fit to the data than the heavier tailed
Pareto.
21  Both the three-parameter Burr 12 (-913) and the four-parameter GB2 (-907) have
likelihood values indicating tighter fits.  The larger likelihood values for the Burr 12 and the
GB2 are achieved at a cost of greater error in individual parameter estimates.  While the
asymptotic standard errors for the two parameter distributions are all rather small percentages
                                                       
20 Loss Ratio and dollar value pricing estimates are based on industry aggregates.  Company level
premiums could in principle be determined by multiplying the premiums expressed in loss ratio terms by
the individual company's earned premiums for the previous year.  This assumes that company exposure is
perfectly correlated with industry exposure.  If it is not, a simple adjustment would be to regress company
losses on industry losses and to use the resulting b estimate as a multiplicative adjustment factor.
21 Because we are comparing fits of different distributions, the log likelihood statistics should generally be
viewed as descriptive in nature and not hard and fast evidence of "a better fit." However because the
Weibull, Burr 12, and lognormal are all nested within the GB2, statistical tests of fit could be constructed
for these distributions.15
of parameter values, for the Burr 12 and GB2 the last parameter (q for the Burr 12, p for the
GB2) have asymptotic standard errors greater than the parameter value.  This may be cause
for some concern as by definition, these parameters must be greater than zero.  Comparing
the asymptotic standard errors to the jackknife standard errors, we see quite a difference in
size.  The ratio of the jackknife standard errors to the asymptotic standard errors are quite
large in some cases indicating substantial variation in parameter estimates attributable to
small samples.  This is most dramatic for the GB2 and indicates that with the flexibility of a
four parameter distribution, very different parameter estimates may yield essentially the same
distributional shape.  Because of this, individual parameter estimates themselves may be less
relevant than examining the relationship between individual parameters within the same set
of estimators.
Another method of assessing the quality of fit of a particular distribution choice is to
compare the empirical mean excess-loss estimates for the underlying data to the what would
be obtained as excess-loss estimates from the chosen distribution fit to the underlying data.
The mean excess-loss is:
] x x [
1 i N
1
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, where N is the number of datapoints and xi, xj are
datapoints.
For example, if given an ordered dataset of five points {5,8,10,15,25}, the corresponding
empirical mean excess-losses are {7.6,6.5,10,10, -}.  The empirical mean excess-losses are
plotted against values from the MLE estimates for the five chosen distributions in Figure 3.
The figure indicates that either the Burr 12 or the GB2 is likely the best choice for modeling
the adjusted historic loss ratios.  The Weibull shows as being far too light in the tail.  The
lognormal fits the bulk of the data fairly well, but is light through the tail.  The relative
inflexibility of the Pareto appears as heavier probability mass and larger excess-loss estimates16
for lower AHLR’s and then less probability mass deep in the tail and smaller excess-loss
estimates.
Figure 4 shows plots of the full sample MLE estimates of the probability density
functions for the five distributions.  The shapes and locations of the mode of the distributions
are similar for the lognormal, Burr 12, and GB2.  The Pareto and Weibull exhibit different
behavior with smaller modes but fatter tails in the 15-35% Adjusted Historic Loss Ratio
(AHLR) range.  The insert illustrates behavior of the distributions in the 35-50% AHLR
range.  Over this range, the Pareto shows greater density but the slope of the density function
is steeper. This indicates that it crosses beneath the Burr 12 and GB2 for higher AHLR's and
reinforces the intuition gained from the excess-loss plots.  The Weibull enters the region with
a larger density value that the other three distributions, but quickly crosses beneath them
indicating very little probability mass at extreme values.  The GB2 plot is above the
lognormal and the Burr 12, but declines more steeply than the Burr 12.  The lognormal
decays more rapidly than the heavier tailed distributions, but less rapidly than the Weibull.
The Burr 12 enters the insert region with the smallest density value, but the slope of its
density function is the flattest. This indicates that the Burr 12 places the most weight of any
of the three distributions on the likelihood of extreme catastrophic events.
The variation about each density function (except the Weibull) is shown graphically
in Figure 5.  The plots are similar to those shown in Figure 4 with insets showing tails in the
35-50% range.  The plots show the densities for the full sample estimates as well as for the
jackknife runs that produce the greatest variation about the full sample estimates.  While the
larger plots showing the 0-50% AHLR range appear to exhibit little substantial difference,
the insets show that there is a great deal of difference in the tails.  This translates to the
material economic difference in pricing as seen in Table 1.17
It is interesting to note that the full sample estimates exhibit behavior more like that
seen for the jackknife estimates where the smallest AHLR is dropped than to one midway
between the average of the two extreme estimates.  This indicates the relative leverage
exhibited by datapoints in the sample tail.
The five distributions produce very different prices for catastrophe calls or excess-
loss reinsurance.  These range from 0.347% of earned premiums ($915M for the industry in
1996) under the Weibull to 1.178% ($3104M) under the Burr 12.  The lognormal prices this
risk at approximately half-again as much as the Weibull, 0.516% ($1358M), while the Pareto
and GB2 provide similar pricing estimates of 0.865% ($2278M) and 0.867% ($2284M),
respectively.
22
Although these distributions generally produce fairly different prices for catastrophe
reinsurance cover, these prices are quite imprecise.  Both simulation standard deviations and
jackknife standard errors are of the same order of magnitude as the prices themselves.  In
some cases either or both are in excess of the estimated prices.
23  The variability of these
estimates is apparent from looking at the jackknife estimates.  This information is displayed
graphically in Figure 6 which gives box-whiskers plots for the 25% catastrophe call for the
five distributions.  The box represents the interquartile range of the jackknife estimates with
the middle bar representing the median value.  The asterisk within each box shows the full
sample price estimate.  Pluses show jackknife estimates outside of two standard errors.  Note
all values outside two standard errors are below the box-whiskers plots indicating the right
                                                       
22 For the Pareto the Cat Call and Call Spread can be priced analytically.  These prices are 0.872%
($2296M) for the 25% Cat Call and 0.792% ($2086M).  Simulation values are used to maintain consistency
across distributions
23 It should be noted that these error measures quantify two different sources of uncertainty and can in some
sense be viewed as similar to different classes of variation in an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
estimation.  The jackknife standard error reflects uncertainty due to the imprecision in the estimate of the
underlying parametric distribution.  The simulation standard deviation reflects uncertainty in the value of
the priced security conditional on having chosen the appropriate estimate of the parametric distribution.18
skew of the jackknife distributions.  This figure shows that the Pareto and the GB2 produce
very similar values across the range of jackknife estimates, with the Burr 12 giving greater
estimates, and the lognormal and the Weibull producing smaller and more tightly clustered
price estimates.
Capping coverage at 50% of industry losses produces a different ordering of pricing
results.  Again, the Weibull and the lognormal produce the lowest prices at 0.343% ($904M)
and 0.448% ($1179M), respectively.  For the CAT call-spread the Burr 12 and GB 2 produce
similar prices that are lower than those generated by the Pareto.
24  The prices under the Burr
12 and GB2 are 0.661% ($1741M) and 0.646% ($1702M).  The price under the Pareto
distribution assumption is 0.788% ($2075M).  Figure 7 provides a graphical illustration of
the prices for the reinsurance layer and gives an indication of spread in prices for given
distributions.  Comparing Figures 6 and 7 we see that by capping coverage, not only do we
reduce price and change the relative order of distributions in pricing, we also achieve
substantial reduction in the variation of prices.
The results for the knock-in call are similar to those for the simple CAT call or
excess-loss contract.  The major difference is an overall reduction in price as catastrophes
between 25% and 30% of industry premiums are not covered.  The amount of this price
reduction is greatest for those distributions with the thinnest tails.  There is little or no
reduction in pricing variation.  These results are displayed graphically in Figure 8.
While the priced securities display different behavior, this is small in comparison to
differences in expected return period.  The lognormal, Weibull, Burr 12, and GB2 predict a
catastrophic event doing damage in excess 25% of earned premiums once every 18-20 years.
The Pareto predicts an event of this magnitude once every dozen years.  There is substantial
                                                                                                                                                                    
24 This should not be surprising given the shapes of the density functions in Figure 4.19
"disagreement" in prediction of frequency of catastrophes causing twice as much damage.
The Burr 12, which has the fattest tails, predicts an event of this magnitude every eighty
years.  The GB2 forecasts 96 years between such events on average.  Under the Pareto, this is
a once every 132 year event.  The lognormal predicts such an event every other century or so.
The Weibull would indicate that such an event happens no more than once a millennium.  For
every single time a catastrophe year with damages of 50% of earned premiums occurs under
the Weibull, it would happen 14 times if the Burr 12 was our prior!
Again, the jackknife standard errors indicate that these estimated return periods are
quite imprecise.  Given recent flooding in the Midwest, it may not be surprising to see a once
a millennium flood every few years.
Tables 3 and 4 use jackknife standard errors to test for differences in security price
and return period estimates across distributions.  Table 3 gives paired t-tests of differences in
prices and return periods.  T-statistics and p-values for the test of differences are presented in
arrays with the lower triangle showing t-statistics and the upper triangle giving probability
values associated with those t-statistics.  For example, the lower-left element in III a. gives
the t-statistic for the difference in price between the lognormal price and the GB2 price
[(0.516% - 0.867%), -2.2059].  The element in the upper-right corner is the corresponding p-
value, 0.0152.  At the 5% significance level, the prices are statistically different for all 25%
CAT calls except the Pareto/Burr12 and Pareto/GB2.
For the 25/50% call spread, the price under the lognormal is distinguishable from all
other distributions save the Weibull.  The Weibull can be distinguished from the three fat-
tailed distribution prices.  At the 5% level the prices for the call spreads are not statistically
different for the fatter-tailed distributions.  For the knock-in CAT call, all prices exhibit
statistically significant differences except the ones for the Pareto and GB2.20
Statistically significant differences are rarer for differences in projected return
periods.  For a 25% event, only the return period for the Pareto exhibits statistically
significant difference from the other distribution derived return periods at the 5% level.  For
the 30% event year, only the Pareto and lognormal return periods are distinguishable at the
5% level.  No return periods are statistically different at the 5% level for a 50% event year.
Another procedure for testing differences in estimates is examined in Table 4.  Here
ratios across distribution assumptions of security prices and return periods estimates are
calculated.  Jackknife estimates of the standard errors of these ratios are calculated and used
to construct t-statistics of the test that the ratios in question are statistically different from
one.  For security pricing, only the Weibull shows up as continually being statistically
different for pricing under this metric giving pricing estimates substantially lower than the
other distributions. For return period calculations, the distributions are statistically
indistinguishable at standard significance levels.
As mentioned earlier when discussing the bootstrap, Efron and Tibshirani (1993)
provide an example of sample correlation and show that the jackknife estimate of the
standard error overstates the standard error achieved with the bootstrap. This would be a nice
result if it were also the case for our estimation as it may provide better ability to discriminate
among distributions. Unfortunately this is not the case.  Figure 9 shows a comparison of
bootstrap and jackknife standard errors for a CAT call with a strike of 25% of Adjusted
Historic Losses.  Figure 10 shows the same for a 25% to 50% spread.  The figures plot the
bootstrap standard error estimates versus the number of bootstrap iterations.  The maximum
number of bootstrap iterations run is 2000.  As n ￿¥, the bootstrap standard error converges
to the true standard error for the given sample.  A smaller number of iterations is generally
sufficient to give a close approximation.  For the lognormal, Weibull, and Pareto distributions21
the standard errors appear to converge to the theoretical limit to which they asymptope for
the 25% CAT call.  For the Burr 12 the standard error does not appear to converge, indicating
that the weight of this tail is such that a second moment of the distribution may be
undefined.
25  When possible losses are capped, as in the 25%/50% spread, this problem is
mitigated and stabilization in the level of the standard error occurs in all four distributions
used.
For comparison, the estimate of the expected value (dashed line) and jackknife
standard error (solid line) are shown.  The figures illustrate that for both simulated securities
bootstrap standard errors are significantly larger than those obtained using the jackknife.
With the exception of the Burr 12, bootstrap estimates of standard errors are on the order of
2-3 times those obtained using the jackknife for the pure call.  For the call spread, bootstrap
standard errors are consistently on the order of twice those seen using the jackknife.  Table
5a. presents the values of the bootstrap standard errors with 2000 trials as well as the
jackknife standard errors for comparison.
An additional advantage of the bootstrap is that it allows for a richer characterization
of the distribution around the statistic in question.  Given a large number of trials, we are able
to construct nonparametric confidence intervals.  For these tail estimates the distributions of
the expected values are highly non-normal and using normal distribution theory to create
confidence intervals produce erroneous results.  Bounding the expected value by 1.96
standard errors, a normal 95% confidence interval, produces an interval of  [-1.07%, 2.93%]
of premiums for a CAT call with a strike of 25% under the Pareto distribution.   This is
problematic as we know that the true value is positive.  The non-parametric 95% confidence
                                                       
25 Bootstrap standard errors are not calculated for the GB2 because of computational difficulty.  Because of
the nature of the process which draws at random from the data sample, the initial conditions specified may
be inappropriate for a particular sample leading to problems of convergence in the MLE stage.22
interval obtained from the bootstrap trials is [0.11%, 3.87%] for the 25% CAT call under the
Pareto indicating the normal approximation is considerably downward biased.  Table 5a.
presents percentiles of the bootstrapped distribution of the expected value of the 25% CAT
call.  While both the lognormal and Weibull distributions produce expected values that are
quite a bit smaller than those for the Pareto, the error surrounding those estimates are larger
and the 97.5 percentile of the distribution exhibits that.  As indicated above, estimates for the
Burr 12 distribution are quite volatile with the upper regions of the bootstrapped distribution
exhibiting values that are implausibly large.
Results for the 25%/50% spread have a similar flavor.  Table 5b. present these
results.  Normal 95% confidence intervals for the Pareto, [-0.70%, 2,28%], again are
downwardly biased relative to the non-parametric bootstrap interval, [0.10%, 2.94%].  The
99
th percentile of the bootstrapped values are all between 3.0% and 3.5% of premiums for the
various distribution assumptions.  This equates to rates on line of 12-14%, values which are
consistent with a selection of historic rates presented in Froot and O'Connell (1996) for
reinsurance premiums.
Hurricanes
In light of the success of USAA’s Resedential Reinsurance deal and following issues
such as Centre Reinsurance’s 1998 issue of Trinity Reinsurance to cover damages associated
with that of a Florida domiciled primary insurer, the market has shown a thirst for catastrophe
bonds with triggers tied to hurricane damages. Figure 2 provides histograms of the insured
losses attributable to hurricanes striking the United States for the period 1949-1993.  The
histograms indicate that the distribution of losses is severely skewed with the rightmost
                                                                                                                                                                    
Additionally, the difficulty of generating the CDF’s and drawing samples from them for the number of
bootstrap trials run was computationally infeasible.23
datapoint representing Hurricane Andrew in 1992.   The histogram of the logged hurricane
losses shows that the logged values are roughly symetrically distributed and implies that a
lognormal distribution might not be a bad candidate to fit the data.
26
The same five distributions (Pareto, Weibull, Log Normal, Burr 12, and GB2) are
used to fit the hurricane data as the aggregate adjusted historic loss ratios (AHLR’s).  Figure
11 plots empirical excess-loss estimates calculated from the data versus those obtained from
tails of the five distributions fit to the data.   As with the AHLR data, the Weibull provides
the lightest tail.  For the hurricane data the Pareto gives the heaviest tail estimates.  In fact the
MLE estimates of the Pareto parameters (l = 177.64, a = 0.797) indicate that the distribution
is not stable and moments are undefined.   Estimates of the Burr 12, lognormal, and GB2
gives tails of intermediate weight between the Weibull and Pareto.  Tails for Burr 12 are
heaviest of these three distributions, while tails for the lognormal and GB2 are essentially
indistiguishable from one another.   Graphed against the theoretical distributions, the
empirical mean excess loss values fall between the Weibull and lognormal/GB2 values.  This
indicates that tail estimates under the Burr 12 or Pareto may be too large.  Table 6 gives
parameter estimates, log likelihoods, and exceedance probabilities for the five distributions.
The log likelihood statistics would seem to reaffirm the choice of either the GB2 or
lognormal as the best pricing distribution.  As the two give nearly identical values for loss
probabilities, we lose little by examining only the first four distributions.
Indeed, for both the Pareto and Burr 12 the weight of the tails leads to problems with
estimation of moments (and conditional moments) for the distribution.  The lognormal does
not incur these problems so long as its parameters (m,s) are well defined.  Because of the
potential of exceedingly large losses to occur, a natural market reaction would be not to offer
                                                       
26 The log-hurricane data has a coefficient of skewness of 0.08 and a kurtosis of 2.19.  Compared to a
normal distribution (0,3), this is indicative of the fat “shoulders” in the observed histogram.  It is24
products with unbounded liability.  As such, observed catastrophe insurance contracts are
sold in layers – excess of loss contracts with upper bounds or call spreads.
27  By limiting
losses from above and below, moments are constrained and therefore, must exist.
  Based on the fitted distributions, the probability of triggering lossses on a $10B/$20B
layer is 2.6% under the lognormal, 2.9% under the Burr 12, and 4.0% under the Pareto. The
probabilty of exceeding the upper threshold is 1.0%, 1.4%, or 2.3% given the same
distributions. From the fitted distributions, the probability of triggering a loss on a USAA-
type contract correspond to probabilities of 0.60% to 0.32% under the lognormal, 0.92% to
0.59% under the Burr 12, and between 1.72% and 1.25% under the Pareto.
28 The expected
losses associated with the $10B/$20B layer range from a low of $42M under the Weibull to
$298M under the Pareto.  The lognormal yields an expected value of $162M.  For the
“USAA Industry Layer” the range of expected values across distributions is from a low of
$1.6M under the Weibull to a high of $211M using the Pareto.  The lognormal gives an
expected value of $63M.
Standard errors for the hurricane layer prices are calculated using the same bootstrap
procedure described above for the AHLR CAT layers. Again, 2000 bootstrap replications
were run.  Figure 12 shows the expected values of the contracts and bootstrap standard errors
for the two layers and the four distributions.  For all distributions it appears that 1000
                                                                                                                                                                    
impossible to reject the lognormality of the data given the small sample size (57).
27 If conditional moments are infinite, this has implications on pricing.  A layer or call spread can be
thought of as the difference between two call options with different strikes, E[L – K1]
+ - E[L – K2]
+ , where
L is the amount of loss and, K1 < K2 are the strikes.  However if these conditional expectations are not
defined, the spread cannot be priced in this manner and a simulation methodology may be the only
plausible pricing mechanism.  Here for instance, the closed form solutions for conditional (truncated)
moments under the Pareto and the exact pricing results that they would give are not applicable.
28 This can be compared to the modeling done by Applied Insurance Research (AIR) in the offering
memorandum for the Reidential Real Estate Bonds.  Under their estimates, the probability of USAA
exceeding a $1B loss attributable to a single hurricane is 0.97%.  The probability of a loss exceeding $1.5B
is 0.39%.  Note that AIR’s probability density function decreases much more rapidly in this part of the tail25
bootstrap trials would be sufficient to characterize the associated standard errors.  Dashed
lines represent expected values and solid lines the standard errors for the $10B/$20B layer
and the “USAA Industry Layer”.  For the Weibull and Burr 12 standard errors are in excess
of the expected value, while the lognormal yields standard errors of similar or slightly
smaller magnitudes than the expected values and the Pareto gives standard errors roughly
two-third as large as the expected values obtained.
The ratio of the bootstrap standard errors to the expected values of the layers provides
two pieces of information.  The first is analogous to a coefficient of variation, and gives an
estimate of the precision of the expected value.  The second, provides for some understanding
of the sensitivity of a prior distribution choice to the leverage that individual data points have.
These ratios by distribution for the $10B/$20B layer and the “USAA Industry Layer” -
lognormal: (0.87, 1.04), Weibull: (2.33,8.38), Pareto: (0.62, 0.69), and Burr 12: (1.25, 2.13).
It can be seen that the Weibull with its thin tails is very sensitive to the sample on which it is
estimated, whereas the Pareto with its heavy tails is must less sensitive to perturbations in the
underlying estimation population.  It is also apparent that as we estimate layers farther out
into the tail, our pricing precision decreases.  This is dramatic for a prior distribution choice
of the thin-tailed Weibull, but much less so for the heavy-tailed Pareto.
Table 7 gives the bootstrap distributions for both layers.  Under the lognormal
distribution, the 95% confidence interval for the $10B/$20B layer is ($9.8M, $507.6M).  For
the “USAA Industry Layer” a 95% confidence interval is ($1.4M, $230.1M).  When
compared to the expected values, $162M and $62M, respectively, these intervals are quite
wide.  Rescaling the industry layer back down to a contract of the same size as USAA’s
Residential Reinsurance issue (a company-level $1.0B/$1.5B layer), gives an expected loss
                                                                                                                                                                    
than do those for the fit distributions.  Calibration of the Burr 12 to this tail steepness for the industry data
would lead to implied distribution moments (mean and variance) that are inconsistent with observed data.26
of $2.2M with a 95% confidence interval of ($48K, $8M).  Expressed as a percentage of
coverage or rate on line, the expected value of the loss under the lognormal is 44 basis points.
Examining the right tail of the expected loss under the assumption of lognormality gives a
95
th percentile of 1.39%, a 99
th percentile of 1.88%, and a 99.9
th percentile of 2.42%.  If we
misspecify the pricing distribution and choose to model losses using the Pareto (either
intentionally or unintentionally), the expected loss is 1.46% and the 99
th percentile of the
expected loss distribution is 4.12%.
An alternative characterization of expected losses that is more apropos to catastrophe
securities presents expected loss statistics in the form of a spread over a risk-free rate of
interest.  The spread, s, is the amount of additional interest necessary to compensate the
security holder such that:
where r is the risk-free interest rate, L are the losses done by the triggering event, f(L) is the
ex ante loss distribution density function, and  ) , ( K K is the interval over which the trigger
event causes partial loss on the bond.  Above K  the event loss is such that there is a
complete loss on the security.
The above equation can be rewritten explicitly in terms of the spread as:
Table 8 gives the bootstrap distributions for the required or actuarially-fair spreads for the
various distribution assumptions with calculations based on a riskfree rate of 5.0% per year.
Spreads are expressed in basis points (bps) or one-hundredths of a percentage point.   Under
the lognormal distribution, the mean estimate for the spread on a bond based on the
$10B/$20B layer and a 95% confidence interval are 181bps and (42.1, 389.1), respectively.
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For the “USAA Industry Layer” the corresponding figures are 51bps (6.9, 135.2).  If a
heavier tailed loss distribution is assumed, the corresponding implied fair value estimates and
95% confidence intervals are 155bps and (51.3, 356.8) for the Pareto, or an expected value of
77bps and a 95% confidence interval of (0, 552.4) for the Burr 12 distribution.  Again




The size of the standard errors and lack of an unequivocal test to differentiate among
pricing estimates has real effects on the premiums paid on reinsurance contracts or
catastrophe calls with strike prices deep in the tails.  If we ignore the jackknife and bootstrap
standard errors and assume for now that our prices are calculated from simulations drawn
from a known catastrophe distribution or are calculated from a meteorological or geophysical
models, the simulation standard deviations raise questions about the ability to precisely
estimate prices.  Figure 13 shows results of the 40 sets of simulations for the GB2 estimates
of a 25% CAT call on the adjusted historic losses and gives some indication of the degree of
simulation pricing variance.  The first plot is for the full sample estimate and the horizontal
line shows the mean estimated price.
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29 The differences between the values obtained for the Weibull and those obtained for the other
distributions are statisatically significant (at the 99
th percentile) using a similar t-test methodology to that
used for the AHLR’s .  While the other three distributions (lognormal, Pareto, and Burr 12) produce
baseline estimates for actuarially-fair spreads that are economically different, they are not statistically
different.28
where N is the number of samples drawn, we can see that the standard deviation of the price
declines very slowly as N is increased for small values of a- potentially much more slowly
than 1/ N .  If we replace a25 by a more general aK , where K is a strike price other that
25%, as aK  decreases, the number N needed to achieve the same level of precision may have
to increase substantially.
30
This may answer some of the questions raised about the apparent increase in prices
for catastrophic reinsurance.  Froot and O'Connell  (1997) present evidence that prices for
catastrophic coverage increased in the wake of hurricane Andrew and the Northridge
earthquake.
31  It has been observed that at the same time that prices have risen, the attachment
points at which catastrophic reinsurance coverage is triggered have risen as well.  Although
the effective amount of coverage may be unchanged (or the price normalized per dollar of
coverage), the location of these attachment points may have very significant impact on the
ability of catastrophe reinsurance providers to accurately estimate their expectations of loss.
But shouldn't reinsurers be risk neutral and therefore ignore unbiased estimation
variance in their pricing?  While traditional financial theory would assert that firms act as risk
neutral entities, there is a growing body of literature questioning this assumption.  Mayers
and Smith (1990) and Doherty (1997) present summaries of some of these reasons as
applicable to insurers.  The most persuasive include cost of i) bankruptcy and associated
reorganization, ii) differential cost of internal and external sources of capital (explored by
                                                       
30 Of course as aK decreases (K increase), EX will decrease as well.  However it is ambiguous whether EX
2 
decreases faster (or slower) than 1- aK  increases.  Shifting the cutoff point does not have a definitive effect
in terms of its effect on variance.  It can be shown that
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, where yi(k) = zi - k, F(k) is the
CDF of the distribution in question evaluated at k, and f(k) is the PDF of the distribution evaluated at k.
This cannot be signed unambiguously and depends on the underlying distribution and the chosen strike.
31 More recently the market for catastrophic reinsurance has softened some with prices declining.29
Froot and O'Connell 1997 as an extension of theory developed by Froot, Scharfstein and
Stein 1993 to motivate risk management), and iii) convex tax schedules (Garven and
Louberge 1996).  All these theories would argue for treating the reinsurer (or purchaser of
catastrophe securities) as risk averse.
32  Given this view, it is important to understand the
nature and magnitude of valuation error estimates to get a better understanding of market
prices.
4. Economics of Securitization
A key issue to the viability and long term growth of securitized catastrophe issues is
the pricing of the issues.  How do the tastes for risk among a general class of investors differ
from those of reinsurers?  If investors with less insurance sophistication and experience feel
they are unable to accurately assess the true risk of loss for a given coverage, this may
translate into catastrophe bonds that are not an attractive alternative to issuers.  However, if
reinsurers have limited underwriting capacity due to the amount of capital required to issue
reinsurance coverage, catastrophe bonds may prove an equivalent or cheaper alternative for
hedging extreme risks.
To date, issues of catastrophe bonds have been relatively few, but a few patterns seem
to exist.  The issue and insurance costs to USAA for the coverage provided by its Residential
Reinsurance bond issue equate to a rate on line of approximately 7.13%.
33   Estimates of rate
on line for similar coverage done under a traditional catastrophic reinsurance contract are on
                                                       
32 These papers are a small subset of the burgeoning corporate finance literature on motives for risk
management and hedging and are representative of this literature only as it applies to reinsurance.
33 Author's calculations based on: (1) fees associated with issue - A1:  $868,000, A2: $3,131,800, (2)
interest cost  (assuming LIBOR at 5.75%, rate as of 6/13/97) - A1: $163,800,00*(0.0575+0.0273) =
$14,758,240,  A2: $313,180,000*(0.0575+0.0576) = $39,178,800, (3) return on invested procedes of issue
(one year treasury bond yield of 5.3275%, rate as of 6/13/97) - $476,980,000*0.053275 = $25,411,110.
Effective Rate on Line = ( (1) + (2) - (3)) / $400M = 7.13%.  This figure ignores any gain or loss associated30
the order of 3.5-5.0%, with the upper end of the range reflecting the potential difficulty of
dedicating the required amount of capital.
34  If these estimates are accurate, this implies that
USAA's cost for placing the issue in the capital markets rather than traditional reinsurance
markets was in excess of $8.5M ( (0.0713 - 0.050)*$400M).
Fortunately for USAA and other insurers who are interested in the capital market
alternative, issue costs seem to be falling.  A smaller issue, Trinity Reinsurance, underwritten
in February by Centre Solutions with a similar structure to the USAA issue, is paying a
spread of 182 basis points on its principal protected tranche and 436 basis points on its
principal at risk tranche (versus 273 and 576 basis points for USAA).  Pricing for the second
USAA issue was in the same neighborhood (roughly 420 basis points, there was no principal
protected tranche). Under these spreads and allowing for a 25% reduction in issue costs, the
effective rate on line for the second USAA issue would be on the order of 4.75 - 5.00%.
35
Since there has been a contemporaneous decrease in the price of reinsurance of 10 - 15%,
assuming a rate on line for a similar reinsurance contract of 4.25%, yields a current capital
market premium of 0.75 - 1.00%, or $3M - $4M for $400M in coverage.  It should be noted
that part of that premium reflects the additional security of fully capitalized reserves for a
potential loss and, subsequently, no default risk - a feature that traditional reinsurance does
not generally provide.  However given that an insurer of  USAA size and stregnth would
likely purchase reinsurance coverage from a reinsurer with a AA rating or better, there is still
room for reduction in the capital market premium.
                                                                                                                                                                    
with fixed - floating swaps contracts or investments other than one-year treasuries, but is probably accurate
to – 0.25%.  Fees are taken from the placement memorandum, interest rates are from Reuters.
34 Figures are from personal communication with Jeffrey Warren, General Reinsurance.
35 Figure for the decrease in fees are from communications with Nial Ferguson, Goldman Sachs, and others.31
The degree to which costs will decrease are uncertain.  Historically, reinsurance, as
other insurance sectors, has seen pricing cycles.  Currently reinsurance prices are soft.  If the
reinsurance market tightens in the near future, the pricing gap may narrow or possibly even
reverse.
36  This raises the question of what fundamental market price this type of risk should
carry.
An advantage of capital market instruments is their relative liquidity and the pricing
information that this can convey.  As previously mentioned, USAA's Residential Reinsurance
issue was heavily over-subscribed.  This may indicate that the deal was priced too
generously.  Evidence of this is provided by Figure 14.  This figure illustrates the yield to
maturity and trading volume for secondary market trades in the Residential Reinsurance class
A2 issue (principal at risk) where Goldman Sachs acted as counterparty over the first six
months that the issue was traded.  The solid line labeled YTM represents the expected yield
to maturity in excess of LIBOR if the issue were bought at a particular calendar date and held
to maturity.  Expected yields are calculated using the exceedance probabilities estimated by
Applied Insurance Research (AIR) and published in the bonds offering memorandum for
severity, and a distribution function that weights the timing of expected losses in accordance
with the historical likelihood, of their occurrence.  The complement of this distribution
multiplied by 576 basis points (the spread paid on these bonds) is presented for comparison
and marked 5.76%*(1-CDF).  The broken lines represent expected yields if actual risk
exposure is zero (above solid lines) or twice AIR's estimate (below solid lines).  Bars
represent the volume of trading done by Goldman Sachs on a particular date, with positive
bars representing purchases of the bonds (increases in Goldman's position) and negative bars
representing sales of the bonds (decreases in Goldman's position).
                                                       
36 This does not mean that catastrophe reinsurance cover structured in bonds will not fluctuate in the
imbedded insurance cost (spreads).  Credit spreads historically have shown cyclical pricing behavior as32
The first point of note when looking at the figure is the drop in yield spread for early
trades in the secondary market.  Initial trades indicate that the true market price of the risk
cover was in the neighborhood of 440 basis points, indicating a rich premium paid to initial
bondholders.  A second feature is that secondary market yields fall as exposure to risk
decreases (i.e.: someone buying the bonds in late September or early October, towards the
end of hurricane season, would get a yield of approximately 100 basis points over LIBOR,
but is only taking one-sixth the risk of loss based on historical occurrences of hurricanes).  If
the actual risk is twice AIR's estimates, expected yield of the bond purchased after mid-
September is less than LIBOR.
Through the end of 1997, some $132M of the A2 bonds were traded, or about 40% of
the issue.  Trading over the last half-year of the bonds life (January – June 1998) was fairly
light as in these months there is essentially no hurricane exposure and the bonds are in
essence LIBOR floaters.  Trading in other, smaller, issues has been relatively light.
37  This
light trading may be indicative of the relative thinness of this market, or alternatively, that the
issue premiums exceed the risks involved and those obtaining initial allocations could not
obtain similar returns for the level of underlying risk if they trade out of their positions.
Indeed, for the risk that investors are taking, the returns these bonds yield are rich
using both market and theoretical benchmarks.  Assuming AIR's exceedance probability
estimates of 0.97% for the trigger of $1B and 0.39% for a loss in excess of $1.5B and total
loss of principal by bondholders are correct, this is roughly equivalent to the historical default
rate on BB-rated debt of 1.06%.
38  Yet a spread of 400 basis points for a one-year hurricane
                                                                                                                                                                    
well.
37 According to Nial Ferguson, Goldman Sachs, much of these were buyers "who did not get there fill."
For example, a large institutional buyer who requested $20M but was allocated only $2M, might not deem
that amount enough to worry about.  Smaller issues tend to have fewer investors holding the issue and each
investor has a smaller allocation.
38 J.P. Morgan (1997), p.25.33
bond is 2-4 times the spread commanded by BB industrials with one year to maturity.
39  If we
assume that the true risk associated with hurricane bonds of similar structure is substantially
greater than estimated, does this justify the spreads?  The one- year risk of default on B-rated
debt is 5.20%, or roughly five times that estimated for the trigger on the USAA bonds.  The
spread for B industrial issues with one year to run ranges from 156 - 204 basis points, or less
than one-half the spread on hurricane bonds.
40
Are these high relative spreads justifiable?  An argument against the size of these
spreads can be made simply by viewing the risks associated with the bonds alone and
appealing to the nature of the potential losses.  An even stronger argument can be made if
these bonds are viewed in a portfolio context. If the risks of hurricane bonds are uncorrelated
with market moves or business cycles, then their returns should be unaffected when stocks
and traditional high yield debt are fairing their worst.
41
A counter argument appeals to the inability of an investor to hedge the risk associated
with the bonds.  Take for example a BB-rated industrial for a publicly traded company.  As
the stockholders are residual claimants on the company’s assets, the value of their shares falls
when the company faces poor prospects.  If those prospects are so poor as to trigger default
on the company's bond issues, the share price should fall precipitously.  Therefore, the
bondholders should be able to (partially) hedge the default risk of their bonds by shorting the
                                                       
39 Spreads over the one year t-bill for BB-rated issues with one year to maturity ranged from 95 to 134 basis
points as of June 2, 1998. (Bloomberg Financial Markets).  In October of 1998 they widened to as much as
225 basis points.
40 J.P. Morgan (1997) and Bloomberg Financial Markets (1998) as of June 2, 1998. Spreads on B-rated
issues with a year to maturity widened to as much as 300 basis points in September 1998 (Bloomberg).
41 However, although assets/events may be uncorrelated, this does not mean adverse market movements
and hurricane risk cannot occur at the same time.  The 1998 market turmoil that began with Russian default
on its sovereign debt coincided with a particularly severe hurricane season.34
company's stock.  Unfortunately, the ability to hedge a hurricane bond in a similar manner
does not exist.
Given AIR's exceedance probabilitites, what would a theoretical model predict the
spread to be given the characteristics of a representative agent? Or, conversely, given AIR's
loss estimates and market determined spreads, what does this imply about the risk aversion of
a theoretical representative agent?
Given the structure of the bonds in question, a stylized model of equilibruim demand
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where U(.) is the utility of wealth (consumption), r is the risk-free interest rate, a is the
fraction of the representative agent's wealth invested in the hurricane bonds, s is the spread
over the risk-free asset paid on the hurricane bonds, L are the losses attributable to the
triggering event, f(L) is the ex ante distribution of losses, and ( , ) K K is the interval over
which the trigger event causes partial loss.  The first integral represents expected utility if
hurricane losses are insufficient to trigger losses on the bond.  The second integral is the
expected value for the range where hurricane losses yield partial losses on the bond.  The last
integral covers the range where there is a total loss on the bond.
Table 9 presents required spreads (s) calculated for a representative agent under a
number of different assumptions on the risk preferences of the representative agent and the
underlying loss distribution.  The representative agent is assumed to have a constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) or power utility of the form U(W) =  g -
g -
1
1 W  and a fraction of his35
assets, a = 10% invested in these bonds.  The agent's level of risk aversion, g, is varied from
0, corresponding to the actuarially fair or risk-neutral spread, to a high of g = 40.
42  In
addition, three distributions are used to represent the distribution of hurricane losses that the
bonds are tied to.  The first (Panel A.) corresponds to a lognormal distribution calibrated have
the same likelihood of a $1B and $1.5B loss as estimated by AIR for the Residential
Reinsurance issue.  Panels B. and C. correspond to lognormal distribution where the
likelihood of a $1B loss are respectively, twice and three times those estimated by AIR, but
the median loss level is the same as in Panel A.
Panel A. indicates an actuarially fair spread of only 62 basis points.  For moderate
levels of risk aversion, the required additional risk premia are quite small, amounting to ten
basis points or less for g < 2.  Assuming that the market demands roughly a spread of 400
basis points, the implied relative risk aversion coefficient is on the order of 30.  This is in a
range of value consistent with what has been deemed necessary to explain the equity
premium puzzle.  Roughly 85% of the spread is risk premia (334 b.p.) where the underlying
risk represents only 15% of the required spread.
An alternative view is that there are two effects seen in the market spreads.  The first
piece represents the risk aversion of buyers, but in addition there is a second piece
attributable to the uncertainty of loss distribution estimates, an uncertainty premium in
addition to the risk premium.  Panels B. and C. re-estimate the required spreads for
distributions with fatter tails.  If the spreads are determined by building a cautionary factor
into the loss distributions, a lower level of risk aversion is required to explain the observed
                                                       
42 An upper value of g = 40 is picked to coincide with values needed to explain the equity premium puzzle
first posed by Mehra and Prescott (1985) which explores the degree of long-term average excess returns of
stocks over bonds given their relative degrees of risk.  See for example, Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) or
Hansen and Jagannathan (1991).  Kocherlakota (1996) provides an overview of the relevant literature and
alternative attempts to explain the puzzle.  36
spreads.  The added risk levels are consistent with the estimation uncertainty observed in
both the jackknife and bootstrap estimation of standard errors associated with loss estimates.
If the bondholder’s view is that the true possibility of loss is twice that estimated, an
actuarially fair spread rises from 62 basis points to 137 basis points.  The difference, 75 basis
points, is the uncertainty premium.  Under this loss distribution the level of risk aversion, g,
needed to explain a 400 b.p. spread lies somewhere between 15 and 20.  If the uncertainty of
the loss distribution is still greater, corresponding to a view that the true likelihood of loss is
three times that estimated by the modelers, a fair spread rises to 219 basis points, an
uncertainty premium of 157 basis points.
43  In this scenario a total spread of 400 basis points
can be explained by a risk aversion coefficient of approximately 10.
It is important to note that the impact of uncertainty and risk aversion on pricing are
intertwined.  Figure 15 plots the required spreads against risk aversion levels for the three
loss distributions.  For all loss distributions there exist a risk aversion coefficient beyond
which the required spread is infinite.  This is not necessarily so in a true equilibrium model
provided there are a sufficient number of agents to place all the bonds.  In a true equilibrium
model, the fraction of the bondholder’s portfolio invested in the bond, a, as well as s, the
riquired spread, is a control variable.  In an extremely risk-averse world, agents would
optimize their portfolios by reducing holdings of the hurricane bonds as well as by
demanding higher risk premia.
5. Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
It is clear that there remains much to be understood with regard to pricing securities
or insurance contracts for rare events or events for which there is no past history of
                                                       
43 Likelihood of loss of 2x and 3x baseline estimates can be related back to the bootstrapped estimates of
the loss distribution.  For the lognormal estimation of the PCS hurricane data, these translate roughly to
using the distribution parameters associated with the 93
rd and 99
th percentiles of  the bootstrap estimates of
expected loss or actuaially fair spreads.37
occurrence in the range of interest.  Tail estimation based on parametric fits to sample data
show wide variation when the underlying data is perturbed under a fixed  distribution
assumption.  If the designer or purchaser of these securities has diffuse priors as to what the
true distribution is, this expected loss or pricing uncertainty will be even greater.  When this
is translated to security prices, it reinforces how little confidence we have in the statistical
accuracy of given prices or loss estimates.
Although differences between distribution assumptions may not generate statistically
significant differences in loss estimates, the economic difference in prices that different
distributions generate is tremendous.  Reinsurers place big bets on the likelihood of
catastrophes and the damages they will cause based on a relatively small amounts of
information.  As this risk is spread to capital markets, more and more entities will be bearing
a piece of this risk.  It is important that we develop better understanding of just how big these
risks are.  Successful capital market developments are predicated on the spread of
information.  The more confidently we can state what the price of a risky security "should"
be, the more attractive these securities will become to a diverse group of investors and the
more successful this class of securities will become - both as liquid investment vehicles and
means of sharing risk.
A major component of pricing these securities is understanding the variability in
price estimates and what effect individual observations have in driving estimates of higher
moments.  Unlike traditional security markets, we cannot easily appeal to arbitrage
arguments to synthetically determine what the prices "should" be.  Quantifying price
uncertainty and narrowing this price uncertainty will lead to better pricing.
To this end, it is important to study the properties of small sample error estimates.
How good an error bounds does the jackknife provide?  Would a bootstrap method be better?
And if so, at what additional computational cost?  Clearly the bootstrap does provide better38
error estimates, but for many users the jackknife and an “adjustment factor” of 2-3 may be
sufficient.  An additional way of studying the problem would be to attack it from a Bayesian
perspective - given a prior assumption of loss distributions, how do price estimates change
given additional information.
However wide our estimates are of the underlying expected value of losses are, they
do not fully explain the premiums that capital markets charge for bearing the risk.  Even
when market spreads are compared to the 95
th or 99
th percentile of an actuarially-fair loss
estimate there is still additional charge paid for transfer of the risk.  Comparing the spreads
commanded for hurricane bonds to actuarially-fair spreads under a lognormal assumption, the
capital market demands a spread of 7-8 times the maximum likelihood estimate of fair value
or one in excess of 2.5 times the 99
th percentile of the fair value spread.   Even appealing to
the risk aversion of investors does not provide a suitable explanation unless we accept levels
of risk aversion that are especially large.
An alternative view is that while these questions are important, it may be necessary to
rethink both reinsurance contract and catastrophe security design.  Given the uncertainty
associated with tail estimation, traditional security forms may be dominated by more
complex arrangements that share this risk more equitably between the insurer selling the risk
and the reinsurer, hedge fund, or other buyer purchasing the risk.
There are many issues to be examined in this new security market. As this market
develops further (and we experience more catastrophes), pricing mechanisms will develop
and our understanding of pricing errors and ways of dealing with them will lead to further
security innovation.39
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134.Figure 1: Histograms of Adjusted Historic Loss Ratios









































sFigure 2: Histograms of Adjusted PCS Hurricane Losses







































sFigure 3: Empirical Mean Excess Loss Estimates
Data and MLE Estimates Historic CAT Loss Ratios
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WFigure 4: Estimated Probability Density Functions from
PCS CAT Data















































































GFigure 5: Variation within Common Probability Density Estimators















































































GB 2 Burr 12
Pareto Log NormalFigure 6: Cat Call - 25%  Excess of Loss








































*Figure 7: Cat Call Spread - 25% to 50% of Loss Ratio Layer








































*Figure 8: Knock-In - 25% Excess of Loss after 30% Trigger








































*Figure 9: Comparison of Jackknife and Bootstrap
Industry Premium 25% AHLR CAT Call

















































Jackknife S.E., Expected Value
Expected Value
Expected Value
Expected ValueFigure 10: Comparison of Jackknife and Bootstrap
Industry Premium 25/50% AHLR CAT Call Spread























































Jackknife S.E Jackknife S.EFigure 11: Empirical Mean Excess Loss Estimates
Data and MLE Estimates Hurricane Loss Data
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WFigure 12: Industry Hurricane Losses - CAT Spreads
$10B/$20B Layer, “USAA Industry Layer”










































































































USAA USAAFigure 13:  Cat Call Pricing from GB2 Simulations - 25% StrikeFigure 14: Secondary Market Trading for
 Residential Re (USAA) Class A2 CAT Bonds
Date (1997)
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YTM
5.76%*(1-CDF)Figure 15: Theoretical Required Spreads on Hurricane Bonds


































3*AIRTable 1 - Expected Losses for Securities Based on Aggregate Annual U.S. Catastrophe Losses
a.  Cat Call with 25% Strike  (Loss Ratios * 1000 and $M) 
Full Sample Jackknife Simulation Minimum Maximum
Distribution Exp. Loss Std. Error Std. Dev. Exp. Loss Exp. Loss
Log Normal 515.67         385.81        563.88        269.24        561.36       
1,358.03 $   1,016.03 $  1,484.98 $  709.05 $     1,478.34 $ 
Weibull 347.26         336.75        316.79        91.95          371.05       
914.51 $      886.83 $     834.26 $     242.16 $     977.15 $    
Pareto 864.87         438.47        640.21        574.87        919.76       
2,277.64 $   1,154.71 $  1,686.01 $  1,513.94 $  2,422.19 $ 
Burr 12 1,178.50      1,232.20     2,222.46     397.68        1,368.32    
3,103.59 $   3,245.00 $  5,852.88 $  1,047.30 $  3,603.48 $ 
GB2 867.19         930.79        885.75        354.65        999.70       
2,283.75 $   2,451.26 $  2,332.64 $  933.96 $     2,632.72 $ 
b. 25/50% Cat Call Spread  (Loss Ratios * 1000 and $M)
Full Sample Jackknife Simulation Minimum Maximum
Distribution Exp. Loss Std. Error Std. Dev. Exp. Loss Exp. Loss
Log Normal 447.59         312.41        413.85        245.74        483.53       
1,178.73 $   822.73 $     1,089.87 $  647.16 $     1,273.37 $ 
Weibull 343.16         330.57        307.24        91.84          366.17       
903.72 $      870.56 $     809.13 $     241.85 $     964.32 $    
Pareto 787.97         379.05        527.70        535.88        834.65       
2,075.14 $   998.23 $     1,389.71 $  1,411.24 $  2,198.06 $ 
Burr 12 661.24         504.73        545.31        302.26        715.09       
1,741.38 $   1,329.21 $  1,436.07 $  796.01 $     1,883.20 $ 
GB2 646.28         551.19        524.85        298.90        714.65       
1,701.98 $   1,451.56 $  1,382.19 $  787.15 $     1,882.03 $ 
c. Knock-In Cat Call - Excess over 25% with 30% Trigger   (Loss Ratios * 1000 and $M)
Full Sample Jackknife Simulation Minimum Maximum
Distribution Exp. Loss Std. Error Std. Dev. Exp. Loss Exp. Loss
Log Normal 468.71         365.78        562.45        235.77        512.35       
1,234.35 $   963.29 $     1,481.23 $  620.89 $     1,349.27 $ 
Weibull 282.77         295.86        311.73        60.08          303.77       
744.68 $      779.15 $     820.95 $     158.23 $     799.97 $    
Pareto 790.16         418.06        639.93        514.16        843.24       
2,080.89 $   1,100.98 $  1,685.26 $  1,354.05 $  2,220.69 $ 
Burr 12 1,139.32      1,222.18     2,222.74     368.32        1,329.31    
3,000.42 $   3,218.62 $  5,853.60 $  969.96 $     3,500.74 $ 
GB2 822.44         925.01        885.76        320.01        953.46       
2,165.91 $   2,436.03 $  2,332.67 $  842.76 $     2,510.95 $ 
Values presented in the upper row for each security and distribution are in terms of Loss Ratios *1000.
For example, the expected value of a catastrophe call with a strike of 25% of industry earned premiums
is 0.51567% of industry earned premiums.
The second row expresses that value in dollar terms based on 1996 earned premiums.  For example,
the 0.51567% translates to $1358 in 1996 dollars.
Minimum and Maximum Expected Losses are taken from the extreme jackknife estimates.Table 2.a. - Log Normal Fit of PCS Annual Catastrophe Data
Distribution Parameters Securities (%AHLR x 1000, $M) Return Period (Yrs)
25% 25/50 Cat  25/30 Cat 
m m s s Cat Call Call SpreadKnock-In 25% 30% 50%
Full Sample Estimates 2.0042 0.7369 -           -           -           26.7 80.0 17.1
- $         - $         - $        
Asymptotic Std. Error######## 0.0072
Log Likelihood -1404.97
Simulation Std. Dev. 563.88 413.85 562.45
Jackknife Std. Error 0.1211 0.0905 0.00 0.00 0.00 32.3 191.1 14.5
Dropped Obs.
1 1.9966 0.7450 -             -             -             25.0 70.8 16.7
2 1.9987 0.7457 -             -             -             25.0 71.4 16.6
3 2.0270 0.7328 -             -             -             26.8 83.1 16.7
4 2.0167 0.7424 -             -             -             26.6 82.8 16.6
5 1.9825 0.7341 -             -             -             27.4 79.8 17.8
6 1.9887 0.7401 -             -             -             25.8 73.2 17.2
7 1.9859 0.7377 -             -             -             26.5 75.6 17.4
8 2.0393 0.7136 -             -             -             25.8 76.0 16.9
9 1.9890 0.7404 -             -             -             25.8 72.9 17.1
10 1.9548 0.6796 -             -             -             53.4 245.5 28.8
11 2.0156 0.7431 -             -             -             26.5 82.3 17.6
12 1.9915 0.7423 -             -             -             25.4 71.6 17.0
13 2.0178 0.7417 -             -             -             26.6 83.1 19.0
14 1.9963 0.7449 -             -             -             25.0 70.8 17.4
15 1.9938 0.7437 -             -             -             25.1 70.9 16.9
16 2.0208 0.7393 -             -             -             26.8 83.7 18.1
17 2.0145 0.7437 -             -             -             26.4 81.8 16.8
18 2.0057 0.7464 -             -             -             25.5 75.7 19.8
19 1.9951 0.7443 -             -             -             25.0 70.7 16.9
20 2.0055 0.7464 -             -             -             25.5 75.5 18.6
21 2.0299 0.7291 -             -             -             26.7 82.0 17.0
22 2.0223 0.7379 -             -             -             26.8 83.8 16.7
23 2.0138 0.7441 -             -             -             26.4 81.5 17.1
24 1.9906 0.7416 -             -             -             25.5 72.0 17.0
25 2.0062 0.7464 -             -             -             25.6 76.1 16.4
26 2.0219 0.7383 -             -             -             26.8 83.8 16.7
27 2.0033 0.7465 -             -             -             25.3 73.9 16.2
28 1.9944 0.7440 -             -             -             25.1 70.8 16.7
29 2.0098 0.7457 -             -             -             26.0 78.8 16.4
30 2.0010 0.7462 -             -             -             25.1 72.4 16.6
31 2.0364 0.7190 -             -             -             26.2 78.2 16.9
32 2.0377 0.7166 -             -             -             26.0 77.3 17.0
33 2.0286 0.7308 -             -             -             26.7 82.6 18.2
34 1.9860 0.7377 -             -             -             26.4 75.6 17.6
35 2.0135 0.7442 -             -             -             26.3 81.3 16.7
36 2.0009 0.7462 -             -             -             25.1 72.3 16.5
37 1.9599 0.6934 -             -             -             43.6 170.9 24.8
38 1.9990 0.7458 -             -             -             25.0 71.5 16.4
39 1.9734 0.7212 -             -             -             31.4 98.8 19.5
mean 2.0042 0.7365 -             -             -             27.22 84.12 17.7
std. dev. 0.0196 0.0147 -             -             -             5.25 31.00 2.3
Dollar figures for security prices based on 1996 Property-Casualty Earned Premiums of $263,351M (Best's 1997).Table 2.b. - Weibull Fit of PCS Annual Catastrophe Data
Distribution Parameters Securities (%AHLR x 1000, $M) Return Period (Yrs)
25% 25/50 Cat  25/30 Cat 
a a b b Cat Call Call SpreadKnock-In 25% 30% 50%
Full Sample Estimates 0.0478 1.2757 -           -           -           0.0 0.0 0.0
- $         - $         - $        
Asymptotic Std. Error######## ########
Log Likelihood -1405.70
Simulation Std. Dev. 316.79      307.24      311.73     
Jackknife Std. Error 0.0185 0.2103 -           -           -           0.0 0.0 0.0
Dropped Obs.
1 0.0497 1.2607 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
2 0.0494 1.2619 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
3 0.0454 1.2870 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
4 0.0468 1.2769 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
5 0.0509 1.2605 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
6 0.0506 1.2584 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
7 0.0508 1.2588 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
8 0.0437 1.2990 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
9 0.0505 1.2584 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
10 0.0355 1.4533 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
11 0.0470 1.2758 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
12 0.0503 1.2587 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
13 0.0467 1.2779 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
14 0.0497 1.2605 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
15 0.0500 1.2594 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
16 0.0462 1.2809 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
17 0.0471 1.2747 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
18 0.0484 1.2669 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
19 0.0499 1.2600 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
20 0.0485 1.2668 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
21 0.0450 1.2898 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
22 0.0460 1.2823 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
23 0.0472 1.2742 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
24 0.0504 1.2586 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
25 0.0484 1.2674 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
26 0.0461 1.2819 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
27 0.0488 1.2650 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
28 0.0500 1.2597 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
29 0.0478 1.2704 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
30 0.0491 1.2633 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
31 0.0441 1.2962 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
32 0.0439 1.2975 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
33 0.0451 1.2886 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
34 0.0508 1.2588 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
35 0.0473 1.2738 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
36 0.0491 1.2633 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
37 0.0433 1.3570 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
38 0.0494 1.2620 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
39 0.0503 1.2746 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
mean 0.0477 1.2780 -             -             -             0.00 0.00 0.0
std. dev. 0.0030 0.0341 -             -             -             0.00 0.00 0.0
Dollar figures for security prices based on 1996 Property-Casualty Earned Premiums of $263,351M (Best's 1997).Table 2.c. - Pareto Fit of PCS Annual Catastrophe Data
Distribution Parameters Securities (%AHLR x 1000, $M) Return Period (Yrs)
25% 25/50 Cat  25/30 Cat 
l l a a Cat Call Call SpreadKnock-In 25% 30% 50%
Full Sample Estimates 1008.14 100.94 -           -           -           0.0 0.0 0.0
- $         - $         - $        
Asymptotic Std. Error 1.6073 1.6168
Log Likelihood -1450.70
Simulation Std. Dev. 640.21      527.70      639.93     
Jackknife Std. Error 140.6695 2.1245 -           -           -           0.0 0.0 0.0
Dropped Obs.
1 996.11 101.11 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
2 1001.40 101.03 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
3 1019.57 100.78 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
4 1012.92 100.87 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
5 981.16 101.32 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
6 988.73 101.21 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
7 986.93 101.24 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
8 1020.10 100.77 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
9 988.63 101.21 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
10 912.82 102.48 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
11 1011.23 100.89 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
12 986.62 101.24 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
13 1002.75 101.01 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
14 995.99 101.11 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
15 990.35 101.19 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
16 1002.93 101.01 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
17 1011.53 100.89 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
18 1005.79 100.97 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
19 994.94 101.12 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
20 1005.84 100.97 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
21 1023.52 100.73 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
22 1009.71 100.92 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
23 1012.10 100.88 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
24 988.48 101.21 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
25 1005.72 100.97 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
26 1009.47 100.92 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
27 1010.83 100.90 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
28 987.18 101.23 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
29 1004.71 100.98 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
30 1002.85 101.01 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
31 1019.07 100.79 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
32 1019.13 100.79 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
33 1024.28 100.72 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
34 986.98 101.23 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
35 1012.10 100.88 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
36 999.99 101.05 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
37 923.95 102.17 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
38 1002.27 101.02 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
39 966.28 101.53 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
mean 998.0758 101.0857 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0
std. dev. 22.8196 0.3446 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0
Dollar figures for security prices based on 1996 Property-Casualty Earned Premiums of $263,351M (Best's 1997).Table 2.d. - Burr 12 Fit of PCS Annual Catastrophe Data
Distribution Parameters Securities (%AHLR x 1000, $M) Return Period (Yrs)
25% 25/50 Cat  25/30 Cat 
a b q Cat Call Call SpreadKnock-In 25% 30% 50%
Full Sample Estimates 2.5081 6.7074 0.8685 -           -           -           0.0 0.0 0.0
- $         - $         - $        
Asymptotic Std. Error######## 0.0395 1.6658
Log Likelihood -912.64
Simulation Std. Dev. 2,222.46   545.31      2,222.74  
Jackknife Std. Error 0.51008 2.87721 0.61439 -           -           -           0.0 0.0 0.0
Dropped Obs.
1 2.5440 6.3425 0.8102 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
2 2.5219 6.4229 0.8237 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
3 2.5042 7.0368 0.8988 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
4 2.4228 7.1365 0.9346 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
5 2.6005 6.2882 0.8117 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
6 2.5972 6.2155 0.7922 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
7 2.6024 6.2318 0.7976 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
8 2.6991 6.5617 0.7894 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
9 2.5959 6.2155 0.7919 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
10 2.3418 8.4135 1.3138 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
11 2.4195 7.1220 0.9337 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
12 2.5846 6.2291 0.7926 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
13 2.4269 7.1448 0.9344 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
14 2.5467 6.3331 0.8087 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
15 2.5690 6.2656 0.7978 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
16 2.4448 7.1430 0.9291 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
17 2.4175 7.1019 0.9317 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
18 2.4499 6.7701 0.8819 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
19 2.5578 6.2979 0.8029 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
20 2.4516 6.7596 0.8802 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
21 2.5410 6.9508 0.8779 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
22 2.4564 7.1290 0.9239 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
23 2.4170 7.0884 0.9302 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
24 2.5894 6.2212 0.7918 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
25 2.4459 6.7951 0.8860 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
26 2.4531 7.1335 0.9255 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
27 2.4725 6.6436 0.8609 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
28 2.5641 6.2793 0.8000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
29 2.4244 6.9579 0.9118 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
30 2.4973 6.5256 0.8410 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
31 2.6437 6.6968 0.8195 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
32 2.6679 6.6375 0.8062 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
33 2.5241 6.9911 0.8875 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
34 2.6024 6.2316 0.7975 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
35 2.4170 7.0806 0.9292 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
36 2.4981 6.5219 0.8404 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
37 2.4236 7.6418 1.1266 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
38 2.5189 6.4349 0.8257 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
39 2.5591 6.6112 0.8861 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
mean 2.5132 6.7334 0.8750 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
std. dev. 0.0827 0.4667 0.0997 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
Dollar figures for security prices based on 1996 Property-Casualty Earned Premiums of $263,351M (Best's 1997).Table 2.e. - Generalized Beta Type 2 Fit of PCS Annual Catastrophe Data
Distribution Parameters Securities (%AHLR x 1000, $M) Return Period (Yrs)
25% 25/50 Cat  25/30 Cat 
a b q p Cat Call Call SpreadKnock-In 25% 30% 50%
Full Sample Estimates 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -           -           -           0.0 0.0 0.0
- $         - $         - $        
Asymptotic Std. Error######## 0.0030 6.3611 69.5452
Log Likelihood -907.14
Simulation Std. Dev. 885.75      524.85      885.76     
Jackknife Std. Error 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -           -           -           0.0 0.0 0.0
Dropped Obs.
1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
9 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
11 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
12 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
13 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
15 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
16 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
17 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
18 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
19 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
20 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
21 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
22 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
23 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
24 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
25 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
26 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
27 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
28 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
29 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
31 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
32 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
33 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
34 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
35 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
36 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
37 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
38 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
39 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
std. dev. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -             -             -             0.0 0.0 0.0
Dollar figures for security prices based on 1996 Property-Casualty Earned Premiums of $263,351M (Best's 1997).Table 3 - Paired t-tests for Difference in Values Using Jackknife Standard Deviations
Actuarially Fair Security Prices Return Periods
a.  Cat Call with 25% Strike   a.  Return Period for 25% Event Year
Log Normal  Weibull Pareto Burr 12 GB2 Log Normal Weibull Pareto Burr 12 GB2
(0.516%) (0.347%) (0.865%) (1.179%) (0.867%) (20.1 yrs.) (18.2 yrs.) (11.9 yrs.) (18.1 yrs.) (17.1 yrs.)
Log Normal  0.0204 0.0002 0.0009 0.0152 Log Normal  0.3596 0.0012 0.2887 0.1868
Weibull  2.0806 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 Weibull  0.3608 0.0970 0.4941 0.4190
Pareto  -3.7772 -5.9138 0.0668 0.4943 Pareto  3.1418 1.3107 0.0131 0.0176
Burr 12  -3.2475 -4.1167 -1.5166 0.0001 Burr 12  0.5596 0.0149 -2.2678 0.3868
GB2  -2.2059 -3.3213 -0.0142 3.8460 GB2  0.8952 0.2053 -2.1447 0.2888
b. 25/50% Cat Call Spread   b.  Return Period for 30% Event Year
Log Normal Weibull Pareto Burr 12 GB2 Log Normal Weibull Pareto Burr 12 GB2
(0.448%) (0.343%) (0.788%) (0.661%) (0.646%) (34.5 yrs.) (38.9 yrs.) (19.3 yrs.) (26.7 yrs.) (26.1 yrs.)
Log Normal  0.0752 0.0000 0.0128 0.0255 Log Normal  0.4066 0.0043 0.1465 0.1266
Weibull  1.4525 0.0000 0.0007 0.0019 Weibull  -0.2370 0.1396 0.2562 0.2466
Pareto  -4.3776 -5.5873 0.1041 0.0924 Pareto  2.6972 1.0898 0.0888 0.0978
Burr 12  -2.2771 -3.3353 1.2691 0.4179 Burr 12  1.0590 0.6581 -1.3609 0.4701
GB2  -1.9829 -2.9821 1.3383 0.2081 GB2  1.1516 0.6887 -1.3056 0.0753
c. Knock-In Cat Call - Excess over 25% with 30% Trigger    c.  Return Period for 50% Event Year
Log Normal Weibull Pareto Burr 12 GB2 Log Normal Weibull Pareto Burr 12 GB2
(0.469%) (0.283%) (0.790%) (1.139%) (0.822%) (207.8 yrs.) (1125.2 yrs.) (132.4 yrs.) (80.0 yrs.) (95.9 yrs.)
Log Normal  0.0073 0.0002 0.0007 0.0137 Log Normal  0.4317 0.1178 0.0289 0.0701
Weibull  2.5004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 Weibull  -0.1726 0.4261 0.4223 0.4235
Pareto  -3.6559 -6.2571 0.0457 0.4206 Pareto  1.1954 0.1868 0.0823 0.2392
Burr 12  -3.3255 -4.3092 -1.7096 0.0000 Burr 12  1.9256 0.1967 1.4035 0.3865
GB2  -2.2485 -3.5135 -0.2010 4.2613 GB2  1.4909 0.1937 0.7125 -0.2895
Lower triangles are the t-statistics for a test of the difference in parameter estimates. 
Upper triangles are the associated p-values for these tests. Table 4 - t-tests for Difference in Ratios of Parameter Values from One Using Jackknife Standard Errors
Actuarially Fair Security Prices Return Periods
a.  Cat Call with $25B Strike   a.  Return Period for 25% Event Year
Log Normal  Weibull Pareto Burr 12 GB2 Log Normal Weibull Pareto Burr 12 GB2
(0.516%) (0.347%) (0.865%) (1.179%) (0.867%) (20.1 yrs.) (18.2 yrs.) (11.9 yrs.) (18.1 yrs.) (17.1 yrs.)
Log Normal  0.3719 0.0691 0.0734 0.2952 Log Normal  0.4060 0.0873 0.3263 0.3169
Weibull  0.3292 0.0307 0.0000 0.1157 Weibull  0.2394 0.3543 0.4962 0.4595
Pareto  -1.5146 -1.9282 0.3893 0.4992 Pareto  1.3838 0.3767 0.0855 0.1279
Burr 12  -1.4811 -4.3472 -0.2832 0.3993 Burr 12  0.4537 0.0096 -1.3955 0.4108
GB2  -0.5429 -1.2163 -0.0021 0.2570 GB2  0.4802 0.1024 -1.1539 0.2270
b. $25B/$50B Cat Call Spread   b.  Return Period for 30% Event Year
Log Normal Weibull Pareto Burr 12 GB2 Log Normal Weibull Pareto Burr 12 GB2
(0.448%) (0.343%) (0.788%) (0.661%) (0.646%) (34.5 yrs.) (38.9 yrs.) (19.3 yrs.) (26.7 yrs.) (26.1 yrs.)
Log Normal  0.4145 0.0311 0.1277 0.2960 Log Normal  0.4146 0.1272 0.2427 0.3134
Weibull  0.2175 0.0507 0.0373 0.1657 Weibull  -0.2173 0.3836 0.3630 0.3770
Pareto  -1.9218 -1.6788 0.4079 0.4194 Pareto  1.1571 0.2983 0.2274 0.2735
Burr 12  -1.1550 -1.8335 0.2345 0.4860 Burr 12  0.7045 0.3530 -0.7552 0.4791
GB2  -0.5404 -0.9838 0.2048 0.0353 GB2  0.4903 0.3155 -0.6076 0.0528
c. Knock-In Cat Call - Excess over $25B with $30B Trigger    c.  Return Period for 50% Event Year
Log Normal Weibull Pareto Burr 12 GB2 Log Normal Weibull Pareto Burr 12 GB2
(0.469%) (0.283%) (0.790%) (1.139%) (0.822%) (207.8 yrs.) (1125.2 yrs.) (132.4 yrs.) (80.0 yrs.) (95.9 yrs.)
Log Normal  0.3878 0.0787 0.0582 0.2925 Log Normal  0.0003 0.2933 0.1676 0.3194
Weibull  0.2870 0.0230 0.0000 0.0878 Weibull  -3.7729 0.4781 0.4587 0.4549
Pareto  -1.4426 -2.0625 0.3707 0.4884 Pareto  0.5484 0.0553 0.3312 0.4179
Burr 12  -1.6070 -4.8556 -0.3324 0.4021 Burr 12  0.9762 0.1045 0.4400 0.4116
GB2  -0.5509 -1.3803 -0.0293 0.2496 GB2  0.4731 0.1139 0.2086 -0.2250
Lower triangles are the t-statistics for a test of the difference in parameter estimates. 
Upper triangles are the associated p-values for these tests. Table 5 - Bootstrap of Adjusted Historic Loss Ratio Estimate 
a.  Adjusted Historic Loss Ratios - 25% CAT Call
Expected Bootstrap Jackknife Ratio of
Distribution Assumption Value Std. Error Std. Error BSE to JSE
Lognormal 0.516 1.1817 0.3858 3.06
Weibull 0.347 1.1763 0.3368 3.49
Pareto 0.865 0.9882 0.4385 2.25
Burr 12 1.179 10374.42 1.2322 8419.43
Percentile of Bootstrapped Distribution
Distribution Assumption 0.01 0.025 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95 0.975 0.99
Lognormal 0.005 0.012 0.022 0.051 0.170 0.471 1.159 2.222 3.204 4.457 5.410
Weibull 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.055 0.311 0.975 2.004 2.914 3.992 5.162
Pareto 0.068 0.109 0.147 0.223 0.436 0.838 1.541 2.456 3.104 3.870 4.565
Burr 12 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.040 0.340 1.312 4.323 21.705 140.583 546.161 1141.814
b. Adjusted Historic Loss Ratios - 25%/50% CAT Call Spread
Expected Bootstrap Jackknife Ratio of
Distribution Assumption Value Std. Error Std. Error BSE to JSE
Lognormal 0.448 0.6859 0.31241 2.20
Weibull 0.343 0.806 0.33057 2.44
Pareto 0.788 0.7609 0.37905 2.01
Burr 12 0.661 0.8986 0.50473 1.78
Percentile of Bootstrapped Distribution
Distribution Assumption 0.01 0.025 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95 0.975 0.99
Lognormal 0.005 0.012 0.022 0.048 0.153 0.413 0.939 1.639 2.102 2.553 3.024
Weibull 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.055 0.307 0.929 1.746 2.396 2.906 3.416
Pareto 0.065 0.101 0.140 0.210 0.403 0.760 1.351 2.049 2.482 2.944 3.415
Burr 12 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.036 0.224 0.719 1.471 2.367 2.880 3.172 3.350Table 6 - Hurricane Distribution Parameter Estimates
Log
Likelihood $10B $20B $28.8B $43.3B
Lognormal (m,s)
   Parameter Estimates 5.5823 1.8647 -434.59 2.59% 1.02% 0.60% 0.32%
   Asymptotic Std. Errors 0.2474 0.2276
Weibull (a,b)
   Parameter Estimates 0.0259 0.5607 -438.09 1.09% 0.13% 0.03% 0.00%
   Asymptotic Std. Errors 0.0030 0.0674
Pareto (l,a)
   Parameter Estimates 177.6394 0.7970 -436.70 3.97% 2.30% 1.72% 1.25%
   Asymptotic Std. Errors 41.0363 28.8724
Burr 12(a,b,q)
   Parameter Estimates 0.8108 484.8228 1.4005 -436.44 2.87% 1.37% 0.92% 0.59%
   Asymptotic Std. Errors 0.1176 73.1859 1.3464
GB2(a,b,p,q)
   Parameter Estimates 0.0354 224.4382 459.7289 456.9926 -434.59 2.60% 1.03% 0.61% 0.32%
   Asymptotic Std. Errors * * * *
Parameter estimates for distributions fit to adjusted hurricane losses in millions of dollars.
*Information matrix nearly singular, asymptotic std. errors indeterminate.
Exceedance Probabilities
Distribution ParametersTable 7 - Bootstrap of Hurricane Loss Estimates 
a. $10B/$20B Industry Layer
Expected Bootstrap
Distribution Assumption Value($M) Std. Error($M)
Lognormal ####### #######
Weibull 42.192      98.016     
Pareto 298.342    184.813   
Burr 12 195.376    243.613   
Percentile of Bootstrapped Distribution ($M)
Distribution Assumption 0.010 0.025 0.050 0.100 0.250 0.500 0.750 0.900 0.950 0.975 0.990
Lognormal 5.306        9.876        18.287      35.117      75.558      165.530    283.277    393.812    456.185    507.614    566.659   
Weibull 0.006        0.060        0.226        1.087        8.279        42.038      127.845    221.961    291.147    354.412    412.196   
Pareto 8.613        21.571      37.149      70.421      155.882    287.632    441.006    557.666    623.135    691.439    759.730   
Burr 12 0.139        0.744        2.423        8.377        54.662      219.807    438.991    621.831    756.596    846.425    924.545   
b. $28.8B/$43.2B Industry Layer
Expected Bootstrap
Distribution Assumption Value($M) Std. Error($M)
Lognormal 62.860 $   64.957 $  
Weibull 1.622        13.471     
Pareto 210.928    145.530   
Burr 12 105.920    224.437   
Percentile of Bootstrapped Distribution ($M)
Distribution Assumption 0.010 0.025 0.050 0.100 0.250 0.500 0.750 0.900 0.950 0.975 0.990
Lognormal 0.548        1.395        3.146        7.782        21.601      61.114      113.094    167.659    200.110    230.907    270.137   
Weibull 0.000        0.000        0.000        0.001        0.053        1.337        8.444        20.959      33.568      51.578      67.880     
Pareto 1.321        5.077        11.029      29.051      86.295      185.938    304.821    408.136    464.107    582.583    596.547   
Burr 12 0.000        0.000        0.002        0.066        7.936        97.322      297.482    528.173    680.889    778.013    865.062   Table 8 - Bootstrap of Hurricane Bond Required Spreads 
a. $10B/$20B Industry Layer
Expected Bootstrap
Distribution Assumption Value(bps) Std. Error(bps)
Lognormal 180.5        91.4         
Weibull 43.2          53.4         
Pareto 319.2        139.8       
Burr 12 206.8        139.8       
Percentile of Bootstrapped Distribution (bps)
Distribution Assumption 0.010 0.025 0.050 0.100 0.250 0.500 0.750 0.900 0.950 0.975 0.990
Lognormal 29.4          42.1          55.7          73.4          111.7        168.5        236.3        306.5        349.1        389.1        437.9       
Weibull 0.3            0.9            1.9            4.8            15.4          38.2          79.4          126.3        164.9        205.2        237.6       
Pareto 48.2          76.0          98.8          140.7        208.7        294.9        400.9        497.1        557.2        619.4        685.0       
Burr 12 3.0            7.3            14.5          27.9          95.8          209.2        383.4        591.2        733.7        825.5        907.0       
b. $28.8B/$43.2B Industry Layer
Expected Bootstrap
Distribution Assumption Value(bps) Std. Error(bps)
Lognormal 51.3          34.0         
Weibull 1.2            5.6           
Pareto 155.3        86.8         
Burr 12 77.3          153.0       
Percentile of Bootstrapped Distribution (bps)
Distribution Assumption 0.010 0.025 0.050 0.100 0.250 0.500 0.750 0.900 0.950 0.975 0.990
Lognormal 4.2            6.9            10.0          14.5          25.9          44.8          69.7          98.0          116.4        135.2        155.8       
Weibull 0.0            0.0            0.0            0.0            0.1            0.9            3.5            8.5            13.5          20.6          28.8         
Pareto 11.3          20.7          31.7          51.3          87.9          139.6        206.3        268.9        309.8        356.8        403.3       
Burr 12 0.0            0.0            0.2            1.0            17.5          75.6          204.1        372.1        487.2        552.4        619.6       Table 9 -  Utility-based Prices for USAA Hurricane Bonds
A.  AIR Loss Estimates B.  Twice AIR's Loss EstimatesC.  Three times AIR's Loss Estimates
Required Risk  Required Risk  Uncertainty Required Risk  Uncertainty
#REF! Spread (b.p.) Premia (b.p.) Spread (b.p.) Premia (b.p.) Premia (b.p.) Spread (b.p.) Premia (b.p.) Premia (b.p.)
#REF! 62 ####### 137 (879.03)     75 219 219.00      157
0.5 67 -1291.03 146 -870.033 75 236 236 157
#REF! 68 -1290.03 150 -866.033 75 242 242 157
2 72 -1286.03 157 -859.033 75 254 254 157
#REF! 83 -1275.03 183 -833.033 75 297 297 157
#REF! 107 -1251.03 240 -776.033 75 393 393 157
15 143 -1215.03 324 -692.033 75 537 537 157
20 195 -1163.03 451 -565.033 75 761 761 157
25 274 -1084.03 651 -365.033 75 1131 1131 157
30 396 -962.034 982 -34.0332 75 1813 1813 157
35 594 -764.034 1600 583.9668 75 3459 3459 157
40 937 -421.034 3107 2090.967 75 n/a -           -          
Loss probabilities in (A.) based on a lognormal distribution calibrated to annual exceedance probabilites estimated by Applied Insurance Research 
(AIR) and published in the placement memorandum forthe bonds issued by Residential Reinsurance Ltd.  Calibrated parameter values (m, s) 
are ( 17.831691,1.244841).  Loss probabilities on (B.) are from a lognormal distribution calibrated to have the same median and twice the
probability of a $1.0B loss as in (A.). Parameter values for (B.) are (17.831691, 1.408095). Loss probabilities on (C.) are from a lognormal distribution
calibrated to have the same median and three times the probability of a $1.0B loss as in (A.).  Parameter values for (C.) are (17.831915, 
1.53963). Required spreads are calculated assuming a representative agent with 10% of his portfolio in Res. Re. Class A-2 Hurricane bonds and 
power utility.  n/a indicates the required spread is not finite.